Natural Argument by a Quantum Computer by Penchev, Vasil
Natural Argument by a Quantum Computer
Vasil Penchev, vasildinev@gmail.com
BulgarianAcademy of Sciences: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology:
Dept. of Logic and Philosophy of Science
Abstract. Natural argument is represented as the limit, to which an infinite Turing process 
converges. A Turing machine, in which the bits are substituted with qubits, is introduced. 
That quantum Turing machine can recognize two complementary natural arguments in any 
data. That ability of natural argument is interpreted as an intellect featuring any quantum 
computer. The property is valid only within a quantum computer: To utilize it, the observer 
should be sit-ed inside it. Being outside it, the observer would obtain quite different result 
depending on the degree of the entanglement of the quantum computer and observer. All 
extraordinary properties of a quantum computer are due to involving a converging infinite 
computational process con-tenting necessarily both a continuous advancing calculation and a 
leap to the limit. Three types of quantum computation can be distinguished according to 
whether the series is a finite one, an infinite rational or irrational number.  
Keywords: infinite computation, quantum computer, quantum Turing machine, quantum en-
tanglement, qubit, natural argument 
The article considers quantum computation both philosophically and mathematically only theo-
retically raising the following questions: 
How can one reduce natural argument in a single mathematical model if the data are a numerical 
series? 
Can that mathematical model be equivalently represented as a computation of a quantum com-
puter? 
The answers of these questions will be deduced successively: 
1 How Can One Reduce Natural Argument in a Single Mathematical 
Model if the Data Are a Numerical Series? 
Any data can be encoded as a numerical series, and this is the way for them to be represented in a 
computer. Indeed the most general model of any computer, with which one works, is a Turing ma-
chine [8], and its data are a Turing tape, i.e. a numerical series usually binary. Consequently the 
natural argument in a numerical series is a general enough task representative for natural argument 
at all.  
Of course all data, which a standard computer can process, are always a finite set. However it 
generates new data in course of processing, which are usually interpreted as intermediate results, 
and the ultimate result can be yielded only when the Turing machine stops and it is or is contained 
in that ultimate state of it when it has just stop. If it does not stop a long enough time, maybe the 
algorithm of processing is wrong and it “cycles” (“hangs up”, came to a standstill) granting that the 
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result should finite. Of course if the problem is such as to calculate e.g. “√2”, the result is not finite, 
and a good algorithm will never stop by itself, too. 
One should distinct two cases: (1) the computer reaches the result, either correct or wrong, in a 
finite time; (2) it cannot reach the result in a given time, either for a wrong algorithm or for an infi-
nite result or for it will reach the result in a time long than the given (the “halting problem”): One 
needs an exact criterion to distinct an infinite result from the absence of any result. Thus this is not 
the “halting problem” yet. One can approach as follows: 
The Turing tape can be always interpreted as a binary fraction and thus as a real number either 
(1) rational or (2) irrational.
1. One obtains a finite set representing a fraction either as the set of digits until to the last “one” (all
are zeros after it) or the sets of digits of the period of that fraction. In both of these subcases a fi-
nite argument is recognized.
2. The binary fraction is infinite and no finite argument can be recognized. Nevertheless the series
of any n first digits is converging to some irrational number where n converges to infinity. Just
this irrational number can be accepted as the argument recognizable unambiguously. The criteri-
on of convergence comprises the former case, too. Consequently that convergence is a general
equivalent to the existence of any result either finite or infinite.
Furthermore one needs to consider the more general case where the Turing machine continues to
work for an indefinitely long time raising just the “halting problem” and producing new Turing 
tapes again and again. Now the questions is what is necessary and sufficient condition for the Tu-
ring machine to obtain a result working for either a finite or an infinite time. Meaning the above 
criterion of convergence, the sufficient condition is: it should just go ahead neither repeating the 
processing of one and the same cell nor going back to process the previous cell. This is equivalent to 
a well-ordering in the work of the Turing machine and thus to the axiom of choice as to the set of 
states (and thus of “tapes”) of the Turing machine. The necessary condition is the above sufficient 
condition to happen for a finite time after the Turing machine has started working.  
Immediately one should reformulate the “halting problem” thus: What is searched is an equiva-
lent transformation (or otherwise said invariance) of an arbitrary Turing machine moving back and 
forth into another moving only forth. If that transformation exists, the Turing machine will not cycle 
though it can run indefinitely. Moreover if one constructs a suitable topology to guarantee always 
that invariance, any computation represented by mappings of neighborhoods analogical to the work 
of a Turing machine will have an exact result. That topology will be equivalent to natural argument.  
Indeed the natural argument in all cases enumerated above means to reveal a limit, to which the 
series of Turing tapes obtained successively in course of the work of the machine converge: 
If it has stopped for a finite time, that limit coincides with its last state, which is the ultimate re-
sult of its work. No leap to reach the limit is necessary since the limit is or more exactly coincides 
with an element (the last one) of the series. 
However if it cannot stop in any finite time and the limit exists, which is equivalent to the above 
necessary and sufficient condition for it, the limit and thus the argument recognized needs a finite 
jump to be reached for any finite time after the machine has started working. The subcases are cor-
respondingly two: The limit is a rational (3) or irrational (4) number: 
3. Though the limit needs some finite leap beyond any result of the work of the Turing machine for
any finite time, there is a one-to-one correspondence of the limit and a repeating sequence of dig-
its occurring constantly in course of working, namely the period of the fraction. In that sense one
can say that the limit is contented in a long enough period of time, during which the machine has
been working. However no one can be sure that the revealed “inductively” argument will indeed
repeat always further.
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4. The limit needs unconditionally some jump to be perceived. This case is intuitively the boundary 
between an automaton, computer, Turing machine, etcetera, on one hand, and an intellect, includ-
ing that of a human being, on the other hand. Consequently if one demonstrates that some device 
can do those leaps in any case when they are necessary, that device will deserve to be called an 
artificial intellect. The answer of the second question raised in the beginning will display just 
this, namely a quantum computer possesses that property however only intrinsically or imma-
nently in a sense.      
Before continuing, the obtained result will be translated from the “Turing language” into that of 
partial and recursive functions, which is known to be equivalent, but nevertheless it offers a differ-
ent interpretation and thus viewpoint to computation.  The leap from any member of a converging 
series to its limit in a Turing machine is equivalent to some minimization operator transforming a 
primitive recursive function of a parameter to the same function with the zero value of that parame-
ter. How that value will be reached for an indefinite, perhaps even infinite number of recursions, 
and thus it is represented just by a “WHILE” operator: “DO something (according to the primitive 
recursive function) WHILE p (the parameter) = 0”. Furthermore any recursive function can replace 
the primitive one. Then one can define any jump and thus ‘the understanding of an artificial intel-
lect’ by a suitable total non-primitive recursive function guaranteeing this leap for any values of the 
input variables.   
If the λ-calculus is utilized to represent such a jump instead of the apparatus of recursive func-
tions or that of Turing machines, this would add nothing new in the interpretation. Indeed the λ-
calculus is an intermediate link between those two, transforming the Turing tape into an anonymous 
function with a single variable in the way to the named recursive functions. Consequently the leap 
will be represented by the initial and by ultimate state both specified by the parameter involved 
before that in course of calculation.  
The common in the three representation enumerated above is a “quantum” understanding of ‘in-
tellect’ as a leap, to which one juxtaposes a continuous trajectory symbolized by the successive cells 
of the Turing tape or by the corresponding recursions or λ-calculations between the initial and the 
ultimate state of the leap. The number of those cells or recursions, or λ-calculations is indefinite and 
even infinite. This correspondence is the way for the leap of ‘understanding’ as an insight suddenly 
revealing truth to be formally represented in the well-developed theoretical language of calculus. As 
one can see a little further, that formalization of any act of an intellect and thus of an intellect in 
general obeys the objectivity it to be realized as a quantum computer.    
Summarizing the answer of the first question, one can say that natural argument can be universal-
ly represented as the limit, to which the series of successive partial calculations converges. The 
necessary and sufficient condition for that limit to exist is a well-ordering of these successive partial 
calculations requiring the axiom of choice to be always guaranteed. In turn that general formal 
model of natural argument allows of defining mathematically any intellectual act of understanding 
as a jump from some finite set of data over a gap of indefiniteness and maybe even infinity to the 
limit to which the series of those data converges since it is the argument recognizable in the data. 
Furthermore that model can distinguish three cases from each other: 
The first case is that of a ‘zero leap’ where the completed calculation is finite and the limit as 
well as the recognized argument is the ultimate calculative state. Any standard computer can “un-
derstand” in this way, but that “understanding” being corresponding to the leap is also zero. 
The second case can be called inductive being intermediate between the “understanding” in the 
first one and the understanding in a proper sense in the third one: The recognizable argument ap-
pears constantly and in equal periods of partial calculations. However a leap needs yet for the calcu-
lation to stop and the obtained partial result to be confirmed as the ultimate one. For example, the 
criterion for a standard computer to stop should be formulated as any, even maybe incredibly com-
plex recursive function, but which must be a primitive one, and thus its “understanding” is again 
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zero. However if one decides that the number of inductive repetitions is “enough” ipso facto making 
a jump without any exact criterion in the form a primitive recursive function, that understanding can 
be designated as inductive and it is yet inaccessible to a contemporary computer. 
The third case requires some nonzero leap unconditionally for the limit, to which a neces-
sarily infinite series of partial calculations converges, does not coincide with any subset of partial 
calculations. That understanding corresponding to the nonzero leap is a one in a proper sense. It is 
granted as the sufficient condition of intellect. It is not a necessary one since any intellect, e.g. a 
human being, can accomplish finite calculations with a “zero leap” or “zero understanding” like a 
standard computer.           
2 Can That Mathematical Model Be Equivalently Represented as a 
Computation of a Quantum Computer? 
The meant model can be considered both as that of any natural argument and thus furthermore as 
that of an intellect.  
Quantum computer can be introduced in a few ways: as a quantum Turing machine [3] or as 
quantum circuits [5], for which [9] has proved to be equivalent. Besides one can utilize a simple 
generalization of a Turing machine where all cell are replaced by quantum ones or otherwise said, 
any bit with a quantum bit (qubit) as follows:   
Any cell of a Turing tape is a bit where a bit is the elementary unit of information, the choice be-
tween two equiprobable alternatives usually designated as “0” or “1”. A qubit, which replace a bit, 
is defined so:  
𝛼|0⟩ + 𝛽|1⟩ = 1 𝑞𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑡                                                            (1) 
“𝛼,𝛽” are two complex numbers such that “|𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 = 1”, and “|0⟩,|1⟩” are two orthogonal 
subspaces in Hilbert space or correspondingly, their bases.  
The empty cell of a qubit can be represented as a unit ball in the usual 3D Euclidean space, in 
which one can choose two points representing the value assigned to that qubit: the one can be any 
point of the ball, but the other should be only in its surface (a unit sphere) obeying “|𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 =1”. The two orthogonal subspaces “|0⟩,|1⟩” are represented as any two orthogonal great circles of 
the ball. 
Consequently if a standard bit is a choice between two alternatives and can be thought as a finite 
choice, a qubit is a choice from a continuum of equiprobable alternatives and requires in general the 
axiom of choice in that sense to be able to be always made. However if one knows the values of “𝛼” 
and “ 𝛽”, the axiom of choice is not necessary for the corresponding point to be chosen: “𝛼” and 
“𝛽” are the values of that qubit. The choice once made and displaying those values can be always 
repeated already without needing the axiom of choice.   
Since any two successive “axes” of Hilbert space such as 𝑒𝑖𝑛𝜔, 𝑒𝑖(𝑛+1)𝜔 represent two orthogonal 
subspaces of it, any point (vector) in Hilbert space has a qubit equivalent as follows: 
Given any vector 𝑉�⃗ of the complex Hilbert space with components  𝐶1,𝐶2, … ,𝐶𝑛,𝐶𝑛+1, … in “ax-
es”, 1st, 2nd,  ..., nth, n+1th, ..., one can construct a one-to-one mapping of it into its representation in 
qubits, e.g. so: 
If both consecutive components, 𝐶𝑛 = 0 and 𝐶𝑛 = 0:  𝛼𝑛 = 0, 𝛽𝑛 = 0 (conventionally).  
If the consecutive components “𝐶𝑛 ≠ 0” or “𝐶𝑛+1 ≠ 0”:  
𝛼𝑛 = 𝐶𝑛�|𝐶𝑛|2+|𝐶𝑛+1|2, 𝛽𝑛 = 𝐶𝑛+1�|𝐶𝑛|2+|𝐶𝑛+1|2                                             (2) 
Consequently any point in Hilbert space interpretable as a “wave function” in quantum mechan-
ics and thus as a state of a quantum system is a quantum Turing tape consisting of well-ordered 
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qubits, and any observable definable as a self-adjoint operator is an elementary Turing computation 
transforming a wave function into another in such a way that the serial number of any qubit is kept: 
One can easily see that the conservation of the serial number in a quantum computation is equiva-
lent to that: the corresponding operator to be just self-adjoint.  
Furthermore one can introduce a special regime for a Turing machine to run: where all cells are 
processed in parallel so that the ultimate state comprising even an infinite number of successive 
cells of the Turing tape in general can be reached in a single working cycle, i.e. by a jump equiva-
lent both to the universal recognition of an intellect and to resolving the halting problem. However 
any Turing machine in the standard regime of successive processing, i.e. cell by cell, will differ 
from the former by an infinite number of filled cells even if they content only zeros.  
One can demonstrate that both regimes would coincide as to a quantum Turing machine as that 
described above processing qubits instead of bits. The same property is also known as the principle 
of quantum parallelism usually granted. As to the natural argument (formalized as above) of a quan-
tum computer, this means that it recognizes always an natural argument as an intellect, but in a 
sense restricted in the framework of quantum complementarity, which will be carefully elucidated 
further.  
One can justify that the parallel and serial processing of a quantum computer coincide as follows: 
The parallel processing means to be made an infinite set of choices (the Turing tapes of qubits), 
each of which in turn chooses an element among infinitely many (all values of a single qubit). In 
final analysis this is equivalent to being made a choice among infinitely many, i.e. all processing of 
a quantum Turing machine is reducible to the equivalent processing of a single qubit for the infinity 
of infinities is not more than one infinity by dint of the axiom of choice in general, which is not 
necessary in the case of question. And the serial processing means some finite set of qubits to be 
treated, which is equivalent to working up the infinitely many qubits of a Turing tape in parallel for 
that finite set of qubits is just as infinite as an infinite set of ones or as a single qubit. The difference 
of a quantum Turing machine from a standard one is due to the fact that the serial processing of any 
finite sets of bits being finite choices is never equivalent to the parallel processing of an infinite set 
of bits. Thus the parallel and serial processing of a quantum computer coincide always while those 
of a standard one can coincide only as to a finite set of bits being due to the different properties 
correspondingly of infinity or finiteness.  
The same intriguing merit of a quantum computer can be demonstrated in natural argument rep-
resented as the leap to the limit of any converging series. Even more (though it is “less” in a sense), 
the quantum computer recognizes (or “imagines” in the same sense) an argument in any infinite 
series (i.e. including the case where the series is not converging). One can say that the ability of 
imagination as it will be formalized a little below is a necessary quality of any intellect including 
that of a quantum computer. 
One can consider two ways the limit of a converging series to be reached:  
─ Instantly, by jump, and as to the natural argument, by “insight” or by parallel processing, and: 
─ Successively, in a continuous trajectory, and as to the natural argument, by “persistence” or by 
serial processing.  
However since one and the same limit is reached in both ways, they can be equated in a sense, 
which is interpreted in quantum mechanics as “wave-particle duality” e.g. meaning the equivalence 
of all trajectories both smooth and jump-like between two points in the Feynman interpretation. 
That equating can be symbolized so: {𝑎, 𝑏,𝑑} ↔ {𝑎, 𝑏,𝑑(𝑡)}: 𝜳(𝑥)                                                      (3) 
Here 𝑎, 𝑏 mean in fact anything as long as some distance 𝑑 can be defined between them, and 
𝑑(𝑡) is a normal (i.e. non-generalized) function of some parameter t interpretable as time for the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648904
𝑑0(𝑡) = � 𝑡 𝜖 (−∞, 0): 𝑑(𝑡) = 0𝑡 = 0: ?̇? = 𝛿(0), 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐 𝛿 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑡 𝜖 (0, +∞): 𝑑(𝑡) = 𝑑  
“normality” of the function. Rather unexpectedly, that always defines a “wave function” 𝜳(𝑥) de-
fined over all space of “𝑥”, where the distance 𝑑 between the elements of the set, to which 𝑎 and 𝑏 
belong, has been introduced. In fact that introduction of ‘wave function’ explicates the equivalence 
of a single qubit (in the left side) and a wave function discussed above.  
Furthermore 𝜳(𝑥) implies a Hilbert space, being a basis in it. Being anything, “𝑎, 𝑏” can be in-
terpreted as two states of a quantum system as the beginning and end of a computation representable 
as the first element and limit of a converging series. Besides the distance “d” can be also interpreted 
as a function of time, but this function should be a generalized, “jump-like” one:  
 
 
                                    (4) 
       
 
Meaning that, the “insight” of a jump to the limit and the recursive construction of a series con-
verging to the limit are correspondingly represented by a generalized function “𝑑0(𝑡)” and a normal 
(non-generalized) but continuous (but not smooth) function “𝑑(𝑡)”, and the values “𝑑0” of the for-
mer and those of the latter “𝑑” coincides: This means that the big leap from 0 to 𝑑 is decomposed to 
little jumps corresponding to the each successive transition from an element of the series to the next. 
Furthermore if the jump 𝑑0(0) of 𝑑0(𝑡) is given, the progress in time of 𝑑(𝑡) to be constructed 
requires the axiom of choice. The development of an “instant”, that of the jump “𝑑0(0)”, into the 
well-ordered temporal sequence of the non-generalized function 𝑑(𝑡) needs it in general. However 
this implies rather extraordinary corollaries as it is usual once the axiom of choice is involved:  
If the series is not converging, the axiom of choice always allows of it to be monotonically reor-
dered, and if it is restricted in any finite interval, it is necessarily converging. The normalization by 
qubit representation as above guarantees that the series is always restricted in some finite interval 
and thus any series can be reordered in a way to be converging: In the present context, this means 
that any data can be reordered in a way an argument to be recognizable from them. However can the 
initial and the reordered data to be granted as equivalent? That would mean an invariance of the data 
to reordering, rather ridiculous at first glance, and thus to the axiom of choice in general, too.  
Nevertheless, the theorems of the absence of hidden variables [6-7] in quantum mechanics guar-
antee just this: Indeed, the state of a quantum system before measurement is fundamentally unorder-
able for them, e.g. as 𝑑0(0) is such, and the same after measurement is well-ordered in a series of 
results, e.g. as 𝑑(𝑡) is such. As one can convince above, the mapping 𝑑0(0) → 𝑑(𝑡) requires the 
axiom of choice, and that 𝑑0(0) itself excludes it: Consequently 𝑑0(0) → 𝑑(𝑡) as a consistent 
whole should possesses that “ridiculous” property, and any state of any quantum system being in-
variant to measurement in epistemological considerations as well.      
All that can be interpreted that any quantum computer being an intellect recognizing arguments 
would possesses furthermore “imagination” in the following sense: It figures necessarily an argu-
ment in any data just as a human being can find some sense in any data even in inkblots as those of 
Rorschach. The difference between “necessarily” and “can” is rather conventional for the free 
choice of “no argument” can be accepted as a kind of argument as the Rorschach tests are often 
interpreted. However can a quantum computer in a “Chinese room” answer “No argument!” to some 
Rorschach test? Yes, it can if it possesses also “self-consciousness” in a sense as in Albert’s theo-
rems [1-2], which will be discussed a little above, too.   
In fact a restricted series can be monotonically reordered always in two ways, increasing and de-
creasing, which can have one and the same limit in particular. However the argument though always 
recognizable by a quantum computer is also bisected in general. Any quantum computer recognizes 
two arguments, which can be called complementary in the tradition of quantum mechanics. Indeed 
if a series is reordered monotonically increasing, this excludes to be reordered monotonically de-
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creasing at the same time in general and vice versa. Even more, an initially converging series as 
considered above allows to be reordered equivalently in another, “complementary” way to another 
series also converging but to another limit and thus to another “complementary” argument. One can 
mock at a quantum computer that it recognizes an argument really always, but it is also always only 
the one half of the argument and no way to be obtained the other and thus the entire argument to be 
put together: The utility also in principle of a quantum computer would be zero if this was so.   
Even yet the Kochen – Specker theorem [6] as well as John von Neumann’s theorem [7] before it 
elucidated that no “hidden half” of the argument just as no “hidden variables” in quantum mechan-
ics. However after this is so, where is the other half and how can it be represented explicitly? There 
is no other option but to be within the first half so that its inaccessibility is due to quantum holism, 
i.e. an eventual access to it would destroy the first one. Consequently the first half of the recognized 
argument is the entire argument [4]. Of course, that is quite impossible as to any finite argument 
thereby to any standard Turing machine, but not if the argument is infinite, and the Turing machine 
is quantum. One can see in detail really how the second half of the argument is “within” the first 
one:   
Any qubit as a unit of “quantum argument” consists of two real numbers “𝑎, 𝑏”, which are quite 
independent of each other as long as: 
𝑎2 + 𝑏2 < 1                                                                  (5) 
There is still a real number “c”, but it depends on them as:  
𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 𝑐2 = 1                                                              (6) 
If any of those three numbers is exactly equal to one, the others are zeros and thereby depend on 
it. One can interpret those “𝑎, 𝑏” as factors correspondingly of discreteness and of continuity or as 
of a wave and of a particle in the joint quantum motion of anything quantum. If any of those “𝑎, 𝑏” 
is “1”, than the case is classical: “either the one, or the other: either discreteness, or continuity; ei-
ther a particle, or wave”. However if not, both components are available.  
In the context of natural argument, the same means that both “pieces” of calculation and insight 
are available in a quantum computer just as in an intellect at all. The third number “𝑐” being non-
zero corresponds to some nontrivial key for both pieces to be mapped into each other one-to-one 
and thereby each to be able to decode the other. This key is, first, infinite, and secondly, always 
different in general: an absolutely unbreakable cipher, so that both pieces are absolutely necessary. 
Nevertheless a single but infinite choice, which is any qubit as a whole, contents both halves. It can 
be  
anyway considered again as one half only in any quantum system, which includes it. 
All this is a way to be interpreted Albert’s theorem [1-2]:  
If a “quantum automaton” is considered as a whole, it contents the other half within itself and in 
a sense, it knows its state. For example the missing half can be interpreted as the “halting problem” 
and thus a quantum computer resolves it as it resolves any problem recognizing an argument al-
ways.   
However, changing the viewpoint, moving to outside, beyond the quantum automaton, the entire 
solving of the problem turns out to be incomplete for the new complete solving should refer to the 
new quantum system involving the external observer in it as well: A quantum computer resolves 
necessary any problem, but it is not able to convey the result outside it itself as a physical principle. 
If a standard computer displays the result to an external observer without changing it, a quantum 
computer can do it only to an internal observer, i.e. only involving the observation as a part of the 
task. If one interprets the universe as a quantum computer, which includes our observation as a part 
of the problem always, it really never “hangs up”. 
The composed quantum system of a quantum computer and an external observer refers to that 
only of the standalone quantum computer so: “𝑎, 𝑏” can be interpreted as the “radiuses” of the 
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qubits of the computer and observer outside though they are 1 seen inside. Then “𝑐” will correspond 
to the “radius” of another qubit equivalent to the degree of the entanglement of the systems of the 
observer and computer. Consequently entanglement can be also interpreted in a computational way 
as the mutual codability of “𝑎, 𝑏” corresponding to the “insight” and “continuous advancing calcula-
tion” of a quantum computer. The “radius” is proportional to the energy of the corresponding quan-
tum systems since it depends on the ratio between the subspaces “|0⟩, |1⟩” and thus on the frequen-
cy “𝜔”.    
Summarizing the answer of the second question, the quantum computer turns out to be an intel-
lect in a sense, which can be represented formally and mathematically. Even more, one can raise 
that whether any intellect has a quantum model, i.e. whether any intellect can be considered as a 
quantum computer, or whether a “non-quantum intellect” can exist in principle.  
Indeed, a quantum computer possesses features seeming obligatory for the definition of intellect 
such as the natural argumentation, “imagination” and “self-consciousness” in a formal sense repre-
sented above. However, locked in the “Chinese room”, it will be absolutely hopeless because it is 
not able to convey its answers correctly beyond it. This is not fatal for the intellect test, though, 
since a human in the same position perhaps cannot answer right being equivalent to a quantum intel-
lect. The discussed model of a quantum Turing machine with qubits for bits implies all those prop-
erties.         
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